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The current experiment assessed the memorial consequences of false denials 
(i.e., denying an event had happened) for neutral and negative material. 86 
participants viewed neutral and negative pictures and their memory and belief 
for these pictures was tested. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned 
to three conditions: (1) Internal Denial, participants were instructed to falsely 
deny questions related to the pictures; (2) External Denial, participants received 
negative feedback from the experimenter; or (3) Control, participants were 
instructed to provide answers to questions they are completely sure about, and 
were told not to guess. A day later, participants had to rate their memory and 
belief once more. The most important finding was that internal denial resulted 
in participants falsely denying they had talked about a certain detail with the 
experimenter, when in fact they did. The current results indicate that denying 
an experienced event may adversely affects memory for the interview itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research into child eyewitness testimonies is difficult because the statements are often of 
unknown accuracy (Bidrose & Goodman, 2000). This is usually the case in legal trials that lack 
objective evidence. Oftentimes, these cases are about sexual abuse. Research shows it is often 
hard for a child to reveal the abuse because the child does not want to hurt the offender and 
has difficulty discussing the abuse itself (Lyon, 1995). Thus, victims of sexual abuse often do 
not disclose upon their victimization and sometimes even falsely deny that they were 
victimized. However, it is still unclear what happens to the memories of a traumatic event 
when people falsely deny an event. In the current study, the goal was to examine the memorial 
consequences of these false denials (i.e., denying an event that actually did happen to them). 
To understand this phenomenon in more depth, it is important to provide more information 
concerning eyewitness testimonies, as they are often a source of evidence in a trial. 
 Oftentimes, judges and juries have to rely on eyewitness testimonies for legal decision-
making when objective evidence is lacking (Smeets, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2004). During an 
evaluation of such testimonies, the central focus is on the accuracy, consistency and 
completeness (Smeets et al., 2004) of these statements. When a testimony consists of memory 
errors (e.g., false memories), it is frequently regarded as inconsistent and inaccurate. 
Therefore, many studies examining the role of memory in legal settings have focused on these 
false memories (i.e., a memory of an event that did not actually occur) and their underlying 
precursors (see Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Loftus, 2004; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & 
Raymaekers, 2013a). There are two types of false memories that are generally distinguished: 
Spontaneous and suggestion-based false memories. 
Spontaneous false memories are frequently induced by using a popular method called 
the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm. 
Here, participants receive wordlists of semantically related words (e.g., tears, fear, weep) that 
are all associated to a critical, so-called ‘lure’ word (e.g., cry). By either using recall or 
recognition tests, participants have to indicate whether they have heard the word. Both recall 
and recognition tests show that a significant number of participants falsely remember the 
critical lure word (see e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2008; Otgaar et al., 2013a). 
Suggestion-based false memories are generally studied by using misinformation or 
implantation techniques (Loftus & Ketcham, 1991; Loftus, 2005). In the misinformation 
paradigm, participants are presented with stimuli and receive suggestive questions in the form 
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of misinformation, followed by a memory test. In the implantation paradigm, participants 
receive narratives of a false childhood life event ostensibly ‘obtained’ from their parents. Both 
techniques indicate that participants can falsely remember events. False memories are of 
importance in court because eyewitnesses can be pressed to recall elements from a crime scene 
or suggestive questions can be asked during interrogation. These suggestive questions can 
contain misinformation, which could alter one’s perception and memory about the event 
(Lane & Zaragoza, 2007). Eyewitness errors are the most contributing factor to wrongful 
convictions (Saks & Koehler, 2005), hence it is no surprise that the role of memory in legal 
cases is of great interest among researchers.  
Though research on false memories is of great importance, one might wonder whether 
they are always relevant in eyewitness testimonies for determining, for example, the accuracy 
of a testimony. Smeets and colleagues (2004) showed that the link between consistency and 
accuracy (i.e., consistency implies accuracy) is actually quite rare in practice. Participants were 
asked on two occasions to write detailed accounts of a violent movie fragment they had seen. 
Accounts were evaluated on accuracy, consistency and completeness. Their results showed 
that these three concepts seem to be independent concepts: Testimonies can be accurate but 
also inconsistent. On top of that, results also indicated that omission errors (i.e., leaving out 
information), and not false memories, accounted for most inconsistencies in testimonies. The 
findings demonstrated that completeness is the most problematic feature of testimonies. To 
conclude, omission errors, not false memories, are the most problematic feature of eyewitness 
testimonies. However, to date, there is virtually no empirical knowledge about the 
determinants of omission errors or related constructs as false denials.  
False denials are likely to occur in legal cases in which, for example, there is a suspicion 
of child sexual abuse. Recent studies show that many victims falsely deny to having been 
maltreated (see Lyon, 2007; Vieira & Lane, 2013). Scientific case studies of childhood sexual 
abuse (see e.g., Bidrose & Goodman, 2000; Leander, Christianson, & Granhag, 2007) compare 
victim testimonies with available objective evidence (e.g., video and/or audiotapes, confession 
of offender). Looking at the level of support for the allegations made by the victims, these 
studies have shown that although the testimonies contain accurate details, victims often 
provide false denials.  
There are different reasons underlying false denials: the perpetrator repeatedly tells the 
victims that the event did not occur, the event itself can elicit emotions of fear when the 
perpetrator is a stranger or when the perpetrator is familiar, or that the victim wants to protect 
the offender (Leander et al., 2007; Lyon, 1995). Therefore, victims of child sexual abuse often 
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delay disclosing the abusive event for several years. In such a period, strategies as false denials 
are often used to withhold information of the traumatic incident (Lamb & Edgar-Smith, 1994). 
However, the most prominent reason for false denials is likely to be shame (Leander et al., 
2007). Victims of sexual abuse may be too embarrassed to talk about the details of the event.  
What happens when victims repeatedly falsely deny to have experienced an event and 
then suddenly report about the event? Curiously, the empirical findings on memorial 
consequences of false denials are extremely limited. Vieira and Lane (2013) are one of the few 
that studied how false denials affect memory. In their study, participants viewed pictures of 
simple objects, and received the instruction to repeatedly lie (i.e., false denials) or tell the truth 
about these pictures by describing them or denying seeing them. Two days later, participants 
had to indicate honestly if the presented picture was studied, and if they had to lie or tell the 
truth during session 1. The results of the false denials condition indicated that falsely denying 
studied pictures resulted in decreased memory performance whereas falsely describing 
unstudied pictures enhanced memory performance. Hence, according to this study, false 
denials can have a negative effect on memory performance.  
In a recent study by Otgaar, Howe, Memon, and Wang (2014a), the mnemonic effects 
of false denials were examined in children and adults. Participants viewed a video. Afterwards, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. In the control group, participants 
were instructed to answer questions they were absolutely sure about, without guessing. In the 
forced confabulation condition, participants were forced to answer all questions, even if this 
meant they had to guess. In the false denial condition, participants had to falsely deny in 
response to each question. A week later, participants received a source memory test, indicating 
their memory and belief once more. Interestingly, participants in the false denials condition 
did not report having talked to the experimenter about a certain detail, when in fact they did. 
This might suggest that previous false denials have adverse effects on memory performance. 
The results imply that denying experienced events is not a good strategy during an interview 
setting with regard to sexual abuse, because false denials seems to have adverse effects on 
memory performance. 
The current experiment will include an internal denial condition (in line with Vieira & 
Lane, 2013; and Otgaar et al., 2014a) and an external denial condition. The external denial 
condition is relevant from a theoretical perspective, because it is informative to know whether 
suggestions can alter one’s memory (i.e., make memory less accessible or less likely to be 
reported). From a practical perspective, it is relevant for legal cases (e.g., child sexual abuse 
cases), in which perpetrators repeatedly tell their victim that certain events did not happen. A 
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recent study by Scoboria, Boucher and Mazzoni (2015) showed that people withdraw their 
belief in autobiographical memories when receiving social feedback from an external source. 
This leads to developing non-believed memories (i.e., a memory you no longer belief in) and 
hence altering memory. The use of such an external denial condition is applied in omission 
studies, which matches the aspect of false denials (see Merckelbach, van Roermund, & Candel, 
2007).  
A subsidiary aim of the current experiment was to examine the memorial impact of 
false denials for negative and neutral stimuli. Because in legal cases, the-to-be-reported event 
(e.g., child sexual abuse) is likely to be negative, a distinction is made between neutral and 
negative stimuli. Studies using stimuli of different valence and which resemble omission 
research are studies about directed forgetting or retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF; Dehli & 
Brennen, 2009). These studies show contradictory results. In such research, participants 
receive stimuli of different valence (i.e., positive, neutral, negative). Participants receive the 
instruction to forget previous trials because these were merely practice trials (directed 
forgetting studies), or participants have to determine whether the stimuli were presented in 
the study phase, whilst not cued with the category (RIF studies). Some studies found better 
recall for positive stimuli (see e.g., Harris, Sharman, Barnier, & Moulds, 2010; Power, Dalgleish, 
Claudio, Tata, & Kentish, 2000), others found better recall for negative stimuli (McNally, 
Clancy, Barrett, & Parker, 2004; Minnema & Knowlton, 2008). Talmi and Moscovitsch (2004) 
demonstrate that negative information is differently organized in memory than neutral 
information. Meaning, negative stimuli is more interrelated than neutral stimuli. As a result, 
negative stimuli might increase the possibility that other negative memories become activated 
and hence memory for negative stimuli is enhanced.  
Taken together, the current study will address the following three research questions: 
First, to what extent do false denials have an effect on memory performance? Second, what is 
the difference between the effect of external and internal false denials on memory? Third, what 
is the impact of emotional valence on memory performance? Based on earlier experiments 
described above, it is hypothesized that false denials might lead to worse memory 
performance, i.e., more false denials of true events and hence deteriorating memory. 
Additionally, if the instruction to falsely deny or receive external false denials is associated to 
social feedback, false denials might lead to the formation of non-believed memories, thus 
memory performance is hypothesized to be worse for external false denials than for internal 
false denials. Finally, it is hypothesized the effect of false denials might be stronger for neutral 
stimuli, compared to negative stimuli. 
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In the current experiment, 86 participants were tested (Mage = 21.16, SD = 2.53, range 18-31; 72 
women). Participants were undergraduate students from the Faculty of Psychology and 
Neuroscience, Maastricht University. They received a credit point or a €7.50 financial 
compensation for their participation. The experiment was approved by the standing ethical 
committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
Materials 
The stimuli are pictures derived from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). The pictures represent emotionally-negative and neutral scenes. 
All pictures were previously rated by using a 9-point scale (1 = negative; 9 = positive) of the 
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Lang et al., 2005). The pictures were chosen based on their 
valence, not too many details present, central position of the critical item and if the critical 
item was clear to see. A paired samples t-test indicates that the chosen negative and neutral 
pictures significantly differed in valence (M = 2.75, SD = 0.74 and M = 5.00, SD = 0.38 
respectively, t(11) = 7.56, p <0.001), arousal (M = 5.14, SD = 0.76 and M = 3.23, SD = 0.71 
respectively, t(11) = -5.50, p <0.001), and dominance (M = 4.10, SD = 0.70 and M = 5.85, SD = 
0.47 respectively, t(11) = 7.99, p <0.001). Previous research used some of the selected pictures 
from the IAPS database (see Humphreys, Underwood, & Chapman, 2010). The pictures were 
presented by using E-Prime, viewed on a 17-inch computer screen. The IAPS pictures were 
shown for 5000 ms with 1000 ms ISI (in accordance with Vieira & Lane, 2013). 
Design and Procedure 
The current experiment employed a 3 (Condition: Internal Denial, External Denial, Control) × 
2 (Valence: Negative vs. Neutral) split-plot design. The variable condition is a between-subjects 
factor and the variable valence is a within-subjects factor. Participants were randomly assigned 
to the different conditions and were tested in laboratory rooms at the psychology faculty at 
Maastricht University. Valence was provided in a counterbalanced order. 
The study contains two sessions separated by a 24-hour interval. During the first 
session, participants were presented with 12 negative and 12 neutral IAPS pictures, presented in 
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a blocked order. Half of the participants first viewed the negative pictures, followed by the 
neutral pictures. The other half of the participants received the reverse order. Participants 
received the instruction to look carefully at the pictures, because they would receive some 
questions about the pictures. After viewing the IAPS pictures, participants received a short 
distractor task (playing Tetris), lasting for 5 minutes. Then, participants’ baseline memory and 
belief for details was measured. Participants were asked ten items related to details present in 
the pictures (e.g., What was the woman at the office doing?), and they had to indicate their 
belief (1= definitely not seen, 8= definitely seen) and memory (1=no memory at all, 8=clear 
memory) for the presented question. These questions were derived from the Autobiographical 
Memory and Belief Questionnaire (ABMQ; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004), 
because research has shown people can develop so-called non-believed memories: Memories 
of which the belief in the occurrence of the event is undermined (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 
2014b). These non-believed memories are most likely to occur when people receive feedback 
suggesting a certain event did not occur (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013b).  
All questions were asked in chronological order of the picture slides. Hereafter, 
participants received a 5-minute filler task by playing Bejeweld. To finish the first session, 
participants ended with an event questionnaire, consisting of ten open-ended questions. Six 
questions were asked during the baseline questioning (ABMQ; i.e., true-event questions: 
Which jewellery did the woman wore?). The remaining four questions pertained to false 
details (i.e., who was lying in bed?), not asked during the ABMQ. For this event questionnaire, 
participants in the Internal Denial condition (n = 29) were instructed to deny in response to 
each question (e.g., ‘What object was between the blue T-shirt and the jeans?’ Answer: ‘There 
was no object between the blue T-shirt and the jeans’). Participants in the External Denial 
condition (n = 29) received negative feedback to three true event questions and two false event 
questions from the experimenter (e.g., as response to the participant’s answer: That [specific 
detail] was not present in the picture, think about this for tomorrow). Participants in the 
Control condition (n = 28) were instructed to provide answers to questions they are completely 
sure about, and they were told not to guess. All participants received the same event questions. 
The second session took place the next day. This session started by informing to test 
the memory of the pictures. Participants received a source memory and belief test, containing 
twelve items each consisting of two closed questions (i.e., yes/no), in chronological order. For 
example: (a) “When we talked yesterday, did we talk about which jewellery the woman wore?” 
[Person question]; (b) “When you viewed the pictures, did you see which jewellery the woman 
wore?” [Picture question]. Then, participants had to rate their memory and belief once more. 
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The source memory items contained six true event questions asked during session 1 (derived 
from the event questionnaire), two true events not asked in session 1 (derived from the 
ABMQ), two false event questions asked in session 1 (false event questions from the event 
questionnaire), and two false event questions not asked during session 1. Participants were 
debriefed after all participants were tested.  
RESULTS 
Source Monitoring 
Memory and belief ratings of the pictures were investigated at Session 2. For belief ratings for 
the picture questions, a 3 (Condition: Internal Denial, External Denial, Control) × 2 (Valence: 
Negative vs. Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the belief ratings at 
Session 2. No main effect of valence, condition or interaction effect was found (all ps>.05).  
For the memory ratings for the picture questions, a 3 (Condition: Internal Denial, 
External Denial, Control) × 2 (Valence: Negative vs. Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted. No main effect of valence, condition or interaction effect was present (all ps>.05). 
Another analysis measured the differences in the number of correct answers of the 
person questions (i.e., ‘When we talked yesterday, did we talk about which jewellery the 
woman wore?’) about the interview itself. A 3 (Condition: Internal Denial, External Denial, 
Control) × 2 (Valence: Negative vs. Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
number of correct answers on person questions. No main effect of valence, F(1, 83) = 2.08, p = 
.15, ŋ²partial = .02, or an interaction effect, F(2, 83) = 1.02, p = .36, ŋ²partial = .02, emerged. A main 
effect of condition was obtained, F(2, 83) = 8.81, p < .001, ŋ²partial = .17. That is, participants in 
the External Denial condition (M = 4.93, SD = .09) and participants in the Control group (M = 
4.91, SD = .10) answered questions correctly more often than participants in the Internal Denial 
group (M = 4.43, SD = .09). 
False Denials 
The primary interest was to examine the memorial consequences of false denials on memory 
performance. The first analysis pertained to whether falsely denying details might cause 
participants to report they did not talked about the certain details when in fact they did (i.e., 
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person questions). A 3 (Condition: Internal Denial, External Denial, Control) × 2 (Valence: 
Negative vs. Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the mean total number of 
false denials. No statistically significant main effect of valence, F(1, 83) = .02, p = .88, ŋ²partial = 
.00, or a statistically significant interaction effect, F(2, 83) = .13, p = .87, ŋ²partial = .00, emerged. 
As expected, a statistically significant main effect for condition was obtained, F(2, 83) = 12.37, p 
< .001, ŋ²partial = .23. Participants in the Internal Denial group were more likely to falsely deny 
they had talked to the experimenter about a certain detail (M = .70, SD = .08) relative to the 
other groups (External Denial: M = .17, SD = .08; Control group: M = .21, SD = .08; see also 
Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. False denials rates on person question per condition (error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals). 
 
 False denials pertaining to picture questions (i.e., claiming they did not see the specific 
detail when asked during session 2, but did provide the correct answers during session 1) were 
measured by a 3 (Condition: Internal Denial, External Denial, Control) × 2 (Valence: Negative 
vs. Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. No statistically significant main effect of valence, 
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Memory 
An additional interest of the current study was to see if the procedure might have led to 
nonbelieved memories. Ratings as nonbelieved memories were applied when memory scores 
where at least two scale points higher than the belief ratings.  
 During Session 2 participants could have developed nonbelieved memories. A 3 
(Condition: Internal denial, External denial, Control) × 2 (Valence: Negative vs. Neutral) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the ratings of nonbelieved memories during 
Session 2. At first glance, participants in the External Denial condition seemed to have 
developed more nonbelieved memories (M = .15, SD = .04) compared to the other groups 
(Internal denial: M = .05, SD = .04; Control: M = .05, SD = .04). However, a main effect of 
condition was absent, F(2, 83) = 1.71, p = .18, ŋ²partial = .04. No main effect of valence, F(1, 83) = 
.56, p = .45, ŋ²partial = .01, and no interaction effect emerged, F(2, 83) = .78, p = .46, ŋ²partial = .02.  
An exploratory analysis pertained to whether participants might report they had talked 
about a certain detail when in fact they did not talked about it with the experimenter (i.e., false 
memory). A 3 (Condition: Internal Denial, External Denial, Control) × 2 (Valence: Negative vs. 
Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the number of false memories for 
person questions during Session 2. At first glance, results indicate more false memories for 
person questions for negative valence (M = .03, SD = .02) than neutral valence (M = .01, SD = 
.01). However, no main effect of valence, condition or interaction effect emerged (all ps>.05). A 
3 (Condition: Internal Denial, External Denial, Control) × 2 (Valence: Negative vs. Neutral) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the number of false memories on picture 
questions (i.e., a false memory for a picture emerged if a participant reported they had seen a 
detail when in fact they could not have seen it). No main effect of valence, F(1, 83) = .08, p = 
.78, ŋ²partial = .00, or an interaction effect, F(2, 83) = .69, p = .50, ŋ²partial = .02 was obtained. 
However, a main effect of condition did emerge, F(2, 83) = 3.90, p = .02, ŋ²partial = .09. Results 
showed that participants in the Internal Denial condition (M = .43, SD = .07) and External 
Denial condition (M = .31, SD = .07) developed more false memories than the control group (M 
= .16, SD = .07). 
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DISCUSSION 
The primary aim of the current study was to examine the memorial consequences of false 
denials for neutral and negative material. The main results can be catalogued as follows. 
During baseline testing, no difference between neutral and negative pictures was observed on 
the number of correct answers. However, belief and memory ratings were higher for neutral 
questions than for negative questions across all conditions. Thus, participants were more 
certain and remembered neutral details more vividly than negative details during Session 1. 
These findings did not emerge on Session 2. 
The most important finding concerns the finding about the memorial consequences of 
false denials. Overall, participants in the Internal Denial condition made more incorrect 
answers than participants in the External Denial or in the control group. The analysis showed 
that falsely denying that certain details had occurred impacted correct memory performance. 
The results indicate that participants in the Internal Denial group, and only for person 
questions, were more likely to falsely deny they had talked to the experimenter about a certain 
detail. This finding is in line with the results of Vieira and Lane (2013) and Otgaar and 
colleagues (2014a). This effect could be explained by the source-monitoring framework 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). According to the SMF, repetition of details should 
increase source accuracy and therefore memory should be enhanced. However, when using 
repeating responses such as false denials, the detail is not repeated. False denials could require 
less cognitive operations. Participants who repeatedly had to falsely deny during the interview, 
have declined memory for the conversation about the specific detail. As a result, participants 
were less likely to remember what they talked about during Session 1 (see also Vieira & Lane, 
2013). 
 The fact that the previous results did not emerge for the External Denial group could 
be the consequence of the fact that these participants were able to respond with ‘I do not 
know’. A fixed number of questions were selected for the experimenter to deny. So, if a 
participant’s answer was correct or incorrect, the experimenter could deny the answer. 
However, due to the fact the participants could say that they did not know, the experimenter 
was unable to deny certain questions. As a result, for some participants in the External Denial 
group the experimenter could respond to only four questions, whilst falsely deny only one 
question for other participants.  
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For criminal investigations, the goal is to obtain complete and accurate account of 
eyewitness accounts. However, using ‘don’t know’ responses can put this at risk (Scoboria & 
Fisico, 2013). In a recent study by Scoboria and Fisico (2013) the influence of instructions to 
encourage or discourage ‘don’t know’ responses was examined. Participants watched a video 
and were randomly assigned to a ‘don’t know’ encouraged, ‘don’t know’ discouraged or control 
group. Results indicated that the use of ‘don’t know’ responses leads to avoiding questions that 
would otherwise be answered incorrectly. Although encouraging ‘don’t know’ responses could 
be harmful (e.g., the output is lower), this does not affect accuracy. Based on the latter finding, 
Scoboria and Fisico (2013) advise interviewers to encourage use of ‘don’t know’ responses, 
because they lead to more accurate reports.  
It is possible that for the current study, the false denial effect only appeared when the 
participants themselves falsely denied the question, and not if someone else falsely denied the 
question for them. That is, it might be the case that when actively falsely denying questions 
yourself, one probably uses more memory processes (e.g., cognitive inhibition). On top of that, 
though the External Denial instruction was similar to the instructions used in the omission 
studies, there was no objective evidence available for the participants (see e.g., Otgaar et al. 
2010). That is, participants in the External Denial condition were not presented with objective 
evidence that might persuade them that their answer was incorrect.  
 A subsidiary aim of the present experiment was to examine whether the procedure 
might lead to the production of nonbelieved memories. The reasoning behind this was that 
previous studies indicate that social feedback enhances the development of nonbelieved 
memories (see e.g., Otgaar et al., 2013b; Scoboria et al., 2015). Participants in the External 
Denial condition received such social feedback. The External Denial condition did show more 
nonbelieved memories, but the results indicate that this finding is not statistically supported.  
 Another memorial consequence was the production of false memories. At first glance, 
results suggest that the production of false memories for person questions were more likely to 
appear for negative questions. However, there was no statistical difference. The production of 
false memories for picture questions were more likely to occur in participants in the Internal 
Denial and External Denial condition than in the control group. False denials might have a 
paradoxical effect on reporting incorrect claims of having seen the pictures at a later point in 
time. These findings resemble the findings of Vieira and Lane (2013), which they attribute to 
fluency effects in memory.  
 From a practical perspective, the findings are of importance for victims who do not 
disclose their victimization. Victims sometimes falsely deny the traumatic event, but the 
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current results suggest that falsely denying is not a good strategy. When a victim of child 
sexual abuse is interviewed about the event, the child could falsely deny having been abused 
because of multiple reasons (e.g., shame, loyalty to the perpetrator, fear; Leander et al., 2007). 
However, when the child is interviewed for a second time, the child might not recall what has 
been discussed during the first interview. As a result, answers can be inconsistent during 
subsequent interviews. Such inconsistencies are seen as an indicator for low credibility of such 
statements (Smeets et al., 2004). Though the current experiment was not based on traumatic 
experiences, it does indicate that false denials lead to a decline of memory performance. 
Hence, victims of traumatic incidents are advised to talk about the event than falsely denying 
the event.  
 To summarize, the current experiment has shown that false denials lead to worse 
memory performance. Participants were most likely to falsely deny that they discussed a 
certain detail with the experimenter when they were instructed to deny the specific detail a 
day before. This experiment used a similar procedure as the study of Otgaar et al. (2014a), but 
with different materials. However, the current study did replicate the findings of Otgaar and 
colleagues (2014a) with picture stimuli. The results join the findings of Vieira and Lane (2013) 
and Otgaar et al., (2014a) in suggesting that falsely denying affects memory in a consequential 
manner. However, underlying causes of false denials and possible other memorial effects are 
still unknown and thus more research is needed to understand the precursors and its 
consequences for memory. This would lead to a more understanding of cognitive processes 
underlying false denials. 
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